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The Role of State Regulation in Financializing the Employment Relationship: Activation Policies, 
Zero Hour Contracts and the Production of Low Pay 
 
Introduction 
 
Real wages in the UK have been falling consistently since 2010, the longest period for 50 
years (Taylor et al 2014). Weak wage growth has persistently been outstripped by inflation, 
meaning workers have seen their real pay fall every year since 2008, back to the levels they 
were paid in the early 2000s (Monaghan et al 2014). This paper contextualizes this 
development by examining the relationship between labour market regulation, paid 
employment, and the State. It argues that the State has been a key agent in providing 
employment regulation that has allowed low paid and insecure employment to increase. 
Specifically LWLVDUJXHGWKDWWKH8.¶VORZZDJHHFRQRP\LVWKHUHVXOWRIUHJXODWRU\FKRLFHV, 
influenced by a political preference for financialization, even if such choices are often 
presented as being politically neutral. This is the result of a two pronged labour market 
regulation. First, the increased dominance of financialization over the last 30 years, which 
prompted deregulation in favour of big business. Second, deregulation permitting Active 
Labour Market Policies (ALMP) and Zero Hour Contracts (ZHCs) and their role in creating 
an environment in which low wage jobs flourish.  
 
The role of the State is important in any such investigation as, since the 1980s, the UK state 
has become more interventionist in the sphere of employment relations, both for different 
reasons and in new ways (Howell, 2015). This role is evident in the sphere of work and 
employment, where the state has extended and/or modified the role it plays, yet also 
continued to form and shape the operation and regulation of labour markets (Forde and 
Slater, 2016; Gamble, 2010; MacKenzie and Martinez Lucio, 2014; Martinez Lucio and 
Stuart, 2011). The changing nature of the state and its interventions in employee relations has 
been covered elsewhere (MartÕ!?nez Lucio, 2015; Howell, 2015; Rubery, 2015; Seifert, 2015; 
Lyddon, 2015; Nowak, 2015; Vidal, 2013; Moore and Tailby, 2015; Forde and Slater, 2016) 
DQGLWKDVEHHQGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWWKHVWDWHKDVEHFRPHµPRUHSUHRFFXSLHGZLWKDQG
interventionist in, the regulation of class relations in order to facilitate a broad liberalization 
of work and employment relatiRQVLQVWLWXWLRQV¶+RZHOO 2; Grady, 2010, 2013, 2015; 
Palley, 2013). Indeed, it has been argued that since the 1980s, financial considerations have 
taken a dominant and central position in decisions about how to both manage, and structure 
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the economy, as well as organizations, and that this has had profound effect on the nature and 
consequences of work (Kalleberg, 2015). Particularly, we see an environment where low 
wages and deregulation of the economy in favor of big business are naturalized.  
 
Any evaluation of the role of the State in legislating for workplace regulation over the last 30 
years within the field of employee relations requires an analysis of the changing political 
economy that underpins this regulation (Kalleberg, 2015), and the associated shift in political 
power from labour to capital. As such, this article uses the concept of financialization to 
present a theoretically informed analysis outlining how, via state regulation of the labour 
market and the employment relationship, financial capitalism has altered the underlying 
logics of an industrial economy. Financialization has been used a number of times by 
separate authors, and from different analytical perspectives. Here ³financialization is 
identified as a process whereby financial markets, financial institutions, and financial elites 
gain greater influence over economic policy and economic outcomes´ (Palley, 2013: 2). As 
such, financialization RSHUDWHVLQWKUHHPDLQZD\VLHOHYDWLQJWKHµsignificance of the 
financial sector relative to the real sector, ii) transferring income from the real sector to the 
financial sector, and iii) contributing to increased income inequality aQGZDJHVWDJQDWLRQ¶
(Palley, 2013: 3).  
 
Thus, disconnection of wages from productivity growth is a key characteristic of 
financialization, which has led to wage stagnation, widening income and wealth inequality 
(Mishel et al, 2007). Moreover, this is also connected to a drive for labour market flexibility, 
which refers to the agenda for weakening trade unions ± by making them less effective ± 
alongside eroding labour market supports, such as employee rights, unemployment benefits, 
and employment protections (Palley, 2013: 23). This paper focusses specifically on this 
aspect of financialization, and explores how the State facilitates this via regulation that 
undermines labour, and how this links to increased income inequality. Though this is 
examined in a UK context, we can see financialization apparent in all industrialized 
economies (Power, Epstein and Abrena, 2003; Jayadav and Epstein, 2007).  
 
There are two broad perspectives that distinguish between financialization as a long term 
historical growth of the financial sector and its power, and financialization as a particular 
stage or epoch of capitalism GDWLQJIURPFLUFDUHIHUUHGWRDV³ILQDQFLDOL]HGFDSLWDOiVP¶
(Sawyer, 2013). This paper adopts the position that rather than just representing a growth of 
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the financial sector in its operations and power, financialization is a particular stage of 
capitalism ± µfinancialized capitalism¶ ± that we can trace back to the late 1970s/early 1980s 
(Sawyer, 2013). During that period, neoliberalism rose to prominence as some processes of 
µILQDQFLDOL]HGFDSLWDOLVP¶ were already underway; for example, the growth in volume of 
financial transactions, alongside some acceleration of previous processes such as 
deregulation, and the addition of some novel aspects, like securitization (Sawyer, 2013: 7). 
The argument is made that financialization has developed in different eras, intensities, and 
forms (Vercelli, 2013). The current era is one RIµILQDQFLDOL]HGFDSLWDOLVP¶a defining feature 
of which is the relationship between the financial sector, and the real sector, which has 
changed in major ways, when compared to previous epochs (Esptein, 2005; Krippner, 2005; 
Sawyer, 2013). This paper analyses the emergence of low pay in the UK, the role of the State 
in facilitating this via particular types of labour market regulations, during this period of 
µILQDQFLDOL]HGFDSLWDOLVP¶  
 
Before analysing the impact of employee relations regulation, and its impact on low paid 
work, this paper outlines the emergence and establishment RIµILQDQFLDOL]HGFDSLWDOLVP¶; 
discussing KRZWKLVKDVOHGWRWKHHPHUJHQFHRIDµILQDQFLDOL]HGRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶DQGDOVRD
µfinancialization of the employment relationship¶. The paper then examines how, alongside 
the proliferation of ALMP and ZHCs, these two developments work collectively to create 
and maintain a low wage economy in the UK.  
  
Neoliberalism, financialization, and WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIµILQDQFLDOL]HGFDSLWDOLVP¶ 
 
Over the last four decades there have been significant developments in the capitalist mode of 
production in Britain, characterised by a move away from industrial and commercial 
capitalism in favour of financialization (Sweezy, 1997; Esptein, 2005; Krippner, 2005; 
Foster, 2007; Sawyer, 2013; Flaherty, 2015). It has been argued (e.g. Overbeek, 1993; 1998; 
Grady, 2013, 2015; Harvey, 2005) that neoliberalism is the ideology that underpins the era of 
ILQDQFLDOL]DWLRQµILQDQFLDOL]HGFDSLWDOLVP¶. McChesney (1999) notes that neoliberalism is 
³WKHGHILQLQJSRlitical economic paradigm of our lives [and] refers to the policies and 
processes by which a relative handful of private interests is permitted to control as much as 
SRVVLEOHRIVRFLDOOLIH´p. 1). At the core of this development is a sharp turn in ideology away 
from the ideas that governed the post-war consensus of the corporatist period, and the 
introduction of new economic doctrines that repudiate the mixed economy.  
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However, just as the understanding of financialization is multifaceted and contested, so too is 
neoliberalism. Thus, we can acknowledge that neoliberalism informs the dominant mode of 
economic thinking, but understand that it does not operate as a rigid script ± simply copied 
and reproduced ± across different locations. Instead, it is flexible and open to local adaption 
and interpretation (Peck and Theodore, 2013; Mirowski, 2013; Ban and Blyth, 2013; Schmidt 
and Thatcher, 2013; Ban, 2016). As such, the role of the State is to translate the global script 
of neoliberalism into local language that can then be applied and understood in a given 
region. Dominant and global scripts (e.g. those espoused by World Trade Organisation and 
the World Bank about the importance of liberalization and flexibility of labour markets) are 
translated by the State at a local level, and this takes the form of policies and regulations, 
which then go on to shape the organization of political and social life (Ban, 2016). Moreover, 
the translation of neoliberalism in any local contexts reflects the intellectual history of that 
region, naturally encapsulating the local struggle for ideas and resources, and leading to 
varieties of neoliberalism (Eagleton, 2007; Ban, 2016).  
 
The increased specialisation in finance of the British and American national economies, and 
the impact this has had on their role in the emerging globalised economy is a result of the 
influence of neoliberal economic thinking that developed during the 1980s (Pantich & 
Konings, 2009: 1). The logic of this new order is to liberate both state and citizens by 
empowering individuals to make their own financial choices for the future. Conversely, the 
Welfare State has been transformed, incrementally moving away from Keynesian and social 
democratic principles, in a bid to unburden the state of complex and expensive financial 
welfare arrangements.  
 
The reconfiguration of the principles underpinning welfare policy has coincided with the 
downgrading in importance of industrial production in both Britain and the USA (Pantich & 
Konings, 2009). As will be shown below, this was prompted by a collapse in the profitability 
of domestic Fordism, which led to a removal of any legacy of corporatism in government 
policy. We could argue that the increasing importance of µfinancial capitalism¶ as a source of 
earnings has reconfigured the state apparatus, policy and regulation, leading to intensified 
implementation and acceptance of neoliberal doctrine in general, as well as the practices of 
financialization in particular (Froud et al, 2006). As a result, we see the reduction of the 
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commitment to industrial capital and the welfare and economic structures that supported this 
variety of capitalism (Grady, 2013). 
 
It has been argued elsewhere (e.g. Grady, 2010, 2013, 2015; Lafferty, 2013; Price, 2015) that 
neoliberal policies have tended to be so successful because they are able to construct 
alternatives as being beyond the realm of what is considered possible ± there is no 
alternative. Lafferty (2013) suggests that, 
³3HUKDSVQHROLEHUDOLVP¶VJUHDWHVWLGHRORJLFDODFKLHYHPHQWKDVEHHQWKH
discrediting of alternatives ± which allows austerity programmes to be presented 
as the only way out of crisis. The most enduring achievement of neoliberalism in 
this respect is a world in which the pursuit of private capital accumulation has 
become not only acceptable but celebrated, through the erosion of alternatives´ 
(p.185).  
 
Furthermore, neoliberal economic policy is also widely promoted by global institutions, such 
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which, over the last thirty 
years, have transported neoliberal, free-market, economic policies around the globe, 
particularly targeting developing economies (Chorev and Baab, 2009). For example, it has 
been arguHGWKDWWKHUXOHVRIWKH:RUOG7UDGH2UJDQL]DWLRQ:72RSHUDWHDV³DSDWFKZRUN
RIXQLYHUVDOLVWLFQHROLEHUDOSULQFLSOHVDQGSDUWLFXODULVWLFH[FHSWLRQV´(Chorev and Baab, 
2009:477), and that such promotion of neoliberal SROLF\LVHYLGHQWLQWKH:72¶V sponsorship 
of policy reforms that affect the interests of diverse groups in the industrialised world, 
including organised labour. 
 
The popularity of neoliberal based economic planning acts to construct behaviour within its 
frame of reference as normal (naturalised), whilst constructing life outside of a neoliberal 
political and economic framework as undesirable or unworkable (Chorev and Baab, 2009). 
For example, even when, to quote the former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Alan 
*UHHQVSDQµWKHIXQGDPHQWDOIODZLQWKHHGLILFHRIPDUNHWHFRQRPLFV¶LVUHYHDOHG; recourse to 
solving economic problems is still sought by the application of neoliberal, market-based 
solutions, regardless of how discredited they may be (Brown, 2010). In sum, despite the 
evidence that neoliberal policies do not work, the perceived necessary medicine is more 
neoliberal regulation. It is argued in this paper that a similar logic is evident in the regulation 
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intended to tackle low pay in the UK, and that the pursuit of financialization of the 
employment relationship and labour market has exacerbated low pay, rather than solve it.  
In her 2015 article outlining changing themes in the field of employee relations, Rubery 
acknowledges that financialization is a key trend; a development she attributes to political 
choices to deregulate, decollectivize and depoliticise the employment relationship. Thus, the 
outcomes of financialization are caused by the application of financialization ± it is not a 
naturally occurring phenomenon, as it is often presented due to the naturalisation of 
financialization and neoliberal logic. In her discussion, Rubery argues that financialization 
FDOOVLQWRTXHVWLRQµZKDWZRUNRUODERXULVIRU¶DVYDOXHLVQRORQJHUVRXJKWIURP
the production of goods and services, but rather from finding other ways to realise financial 
value.  
 
In order to allow this to happen financial markets have been deregulated, but also integrated 
in the UK economy (Rubery, 2015: 639). This occurred alongside the decline in 
manufacturing, and the turn towards a service-based driven economy; thus we see a 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJPRYHPHQWIURPµSURGXFWLRQYDOXHVWRILQDQFLDOYDOXHV¶Rubery, 2015: 640; 
Ackroyd and Murphy, 2013), and the pursuit of shareholder value (Thompson, 2003). This 
development is also discussed by Thompson (2003) in his Disconnected Capitalism Thesis, 
where he argued that financialization becomes a key driver of corporate and workplace 
change, which in turn undermines the stable conditions necessary for workplace-based 
productivity bargains, and investment in human capital.  
 
Therefore, financialization underpins a type of corporate governance normativity that in order 
to increase shareholder value, is reliant upon a reconfiguration of workplace relations, which 
worsen conditions for employees (Thompson, 2003; Ireland, 2005; 2009). A by-product of 
reshaping the focus of the economy, financialization has also led to a shift from high quality, 
high skilled, high pay work, to low skilled and low pay work, characterized by limited 
workplace security. Appelbaum, Batt and Clark (2013), in their analysis of the financialized 
business model of private equity, argue that money is made through extracting value from 
other stakeholders including customers, creditors, suppliers and employees. In this context, 
low pay work is a result of the VWDWH¶Vapplication of financialization through regulatory 
frameworks, and the subsequent impact this has on corporate behaviour, and workplace 
change, as outlined by Thompson (2003), in their pursuit of a new accumulation regime as 
they pursue other ways to realise financial value. 
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The state, therefore, aVDµPDUNHWPDNLQJinstitution¶(Polanyi, 1944), has played an important 
role in the development of financialization in the employment relationship (Rubery, 2015; 
Grady, 2013; Daniels and McIllroy, 2009). This can be seen, for example, in the 
³HQFRXUDJHPHQWRIPRUHµLQGLYLGXDOL]HG¶HPSOR\PHQWFRQWUDFWVRYHUFROOHFWLYHDJUHHPHQWV´
(Forde and Slater, 2016:592). In responding to what the neoliberal ideology actually calls for, 
which is not the liberalization of markets as is often suggested, but the diffusion of market 
relations into all aspects of the economy and social life, the role of the state has been 
heightened. Martin (2002) alludes to this, noting that the influence of financial calculations 
and judgments in regulation and State decision making has reshaped institutions on the model 
of the market. The state is now expected to provide coherence and cogency to neoliberal 
capitalism (Plant 2012) and manage class relations; whether by attempting to limit and 
smooth conflict or intervening decisively in order to overcome resistance to liberalization 
(Howell, 2015). For example, in the UK, neoliberal policy prescriptions urging 
³GLVLQIODWLRQDU\ monetary policies, deficit reduction, partial dismantling of the welfare state, 
[and] flexible labour markets´ were adopted in the UK; many of which were first enacted by 
Margaret Thatcher, but have been further carried on by subsequent governments (Polanyi-
Levitt, 2013: 56).  
 
Dumenil and Levy (2011) point out that the class dimension of financialization expresses the 
strategy of the capitalist classes in alliance with upper management, specifically financial 
managers, intending to strengthen their hegemony and expand it globally. They go on to 
argue that neoliberalism has not functioned as government for the market, but as one for the 
restoration of very high income. This can be seen in the regulation of financial markets, and 
financial incentives provided by monetary policies enacted so as to ward off inflation, which 
encourages corporations to move away from traditional forms of capital accumulation ± e.g. 
reinvesting in productive industry and infrastructure ± and towards creating high income for 
managers and owners, as well as dividends and increasing stock prices for investors.  
 
The impact of this is that short-termism is required in order for organizations and economies 
to be flexibly competitive. This has resulted in little to no long-term security for employees, 
ZLWKQRWKLQJSUHYHQWLQJRUJDQLVDWLRQVIURP³seeking an entirely different way of realising 
ILQDQFLDOYDOXH´ (Rubery, 2015: 640). This can be achieved via various methods; for example, 
selling assets, investing profits in financial products, or simply outsourcing product and 
service activities elsewhere. It ultimately makes work contingent and fundamentally changes 
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the nature of work, moving away from the idea that work provides meaning or meets the 
needs of citizens (Rubery, 2015; Thompson, 2003, 2013). In addition, the contingent nature 
of work, and search for financial value has also resulted in undermining the main leverage 
that workers have over their employers ± ³that is the dependency of the employer on their 
cooperation and the qualiW\DQGLQWHQVLW\RIWKDWODERXU´ (Rubery, 2015; 640). This argument, 
outlined above, was first made by Thompson (2003), and more recently by Cushen and 
Thompson (2016), in their work on financialization and value.  
 
Both articles demonstrate that there is an increasing disconnect between localised employer 
strategies from work/management, and wider, global strategies for value accumulation. 
Moreover, it is noted (e.g. Cushen and Thompson, 2016; Froud et al, 2016) that a key aspect 
of financialization is that non-financial corporations (NFCs)i rely heavily on accounting 
techniques. These techniques position financial targets as central and dominant in 
organisational decision making; this is, ultimately, these targets are delivered by employees 
(Cushen and Thompson, 2016). Thus, financialization is not something that only occurs on a 
macro level; we can see that on a meso-RUJDQL]DWLRQDOOHYHO³Oabour and the labour process, 
is called upon to contribute to organizational value, and that in recent years, this has in fact 
expanded´ (Cushen and Thompson, 2016: 7-10).  
 
The Emergence of the Neoliberal Organization  
 
The role of organizations and the related changing constitution of financial markets mean that 
managerial decision making ± which impacts on ZRUNHUV¶ day to day lives ± is increasingly 
focused on market valuations of companies based on share price, returns to investors and 
creating market confidence (Froud et al, 2006; Cushen and Thompson, 2016; Piketty, 2014). 
(YLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWLQWKLVHUDRIµILQDQFLDOL]HGFDSLWDO¶ODERXUFRVWUHGXFWLRQKDVEHFRPH
the main object of management intervention, as the financial outcomes of other types of 
management activity has produced disappointing outcomes for capital (Froud et al, 2006: 
109). Corporate restructuring, alongside mergers and acquisitions has tended to compensate; 
hence labour-cost-reduction strategies ± experienced by workers via squeezing labour to 
reduce costs by whatever means necessary (usually resulting in downward pressure upon 
salaries) ± have come to dominate corporate behaviour in the neoliberal organization (Froud 
et al, 2006). A catalyst for this has been the distributive effects of the orientation towards 
shareholder primacy, which has directly led to an increase in income inequality alongside 
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poorer working conditions for those outside of top management circles (Demir, 2007; Dore, 
2008; Brenner and Wernicke, 2015; Jansson et al, 2016). This has been accelerated by the 
shift from labour to capital intensive industries, in addition to the growing decline of labour 
share within industries. This has been particularly noticeable in those industries where profits 
have grown VLJQLILFDQWO\VXFKDVILQDQFH³which has been accompanied by simultaneous 
accumulation of capital income E\WKHYHU\WRSRIZDJHHDUQHUV´ (Kochan and Riordan, 2016: 
420). 
 
This is most evident when we examine executive pay and learn that the squeeze on working 
conditions and wages is not a universal phenomenon in organizations. Whilst it is true that 
we have witnessed a flat-lining of real income growth for low and middle income brackets 
over the last four decades (Van Arnum and Naples, 2013); the incomes of the top 10 per cent 
have increased rapidly. Prominent amongst the latter has been corporate remuneration ±the 
so-FDOOHGµVXSHU-ZDJHV¶WRS found among corporate top-executives (Piketty, 2014; 
Brenner and Wernicke, 2015). Ironically, due to various work intensLILFDWLRQPHDVXUHV³Whe 
flat lining of employHHV¶LQFRPHFRPHVLQDWLPHZKHQDYHUDJHHPSOR\HHSURGXFWLYLW\DV
well as average earnings per employee, have been rising´(Jonsson et al, 2016:4). This aptly 
shows how organizations have been able to extract greater value from their employees 
twofold, via an increase in productivity whilst simultaneously lowering wages.  
 
Meanwhile, we also witness corporate behaviour that further enshrines the importance of 
profit and shareholder value, such as corporations engaging in various share buybacks in 
order to facilitate fast redistribution of profits to shareholders (Jacoby, 2008; Lazonick 2014). 
This has led to dramatically increased shareholder pay-outs compared to previous eras. This 
behaviour can be traced to state deregulation, which allows corporations to embody ³the 
capacity to construct and govern value chains in which the value produced can be channelled 
in different directions ± to be realised as profits in any number of possible locations´ 
(Ackroyd and Murphy, 2013: 345). A concrete example of this are tax legislation repeals in 
the USA.  
 
Given the values implicit in financialization, ³it should not surprise us that the realisation of 
profits often occurs in places where taxation will be minimal and well beyond the reach of 
state revenue authorities´ (Ackroyd and Murphy, 2013: 345). However, as noted, this is 
sanctioned by the state as they enact deregulation that allows this activity to occur.  
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These trends in the distribution of global wealth, which facilitate the development of large 
corporations as significant agents, are consistent with the emergence of a new corporate 
governance normativity that emerged from the 1970s onwards (Ireland, 2005; 2009). The 
prioritization of shareholder value over the last 30-40 years thus connects both historically 
and also programmatically to the emergence of neoliberalism during that period (Lazonick 
DQG2¶6XOOLYDQ,UHODQG0LURZVNLDQG3OHKZH3HFN+HLOEURQHW
al., 2014; Jansson et al, 2016). The important thing to note here is that state regulation has 
allowed organisations to behave in this way, naturalising this as normal corporate behaviour.  
 
State regulation has facilitated the corporate view that employees are an easily disposable 
cost, or at the least are an obvious source of overhead reduction. A recent example of this, 
FRYHUHGLQ)RUGHDQG6ODWHU¶V (2016) examination of the EU Agency Worker Directive, 
demonstrates that the UK state has ³ushered in regulations that embed capital-labour relations 
favoring the actions of employers, and which allow for and promote further flexibility in the 
use of temporary labour contracts´S603). This is in contrast to the way in which the 
Agency Worker Directive has been implemented in other EU countries, leaving UK agency 
ZRUNHUVZLWK³XQHYHQQHVVRISURWHFWLRQZLWKVRPHZRUNHUVFOHDUO\QRWEHQHILWWLQJIURPSD\
HTXDOLW\´ (Forde and Slater, 2016: 602). Moreover, this has created a regulatory space to 
specifically avoid many of the originally intended protections offered by the EU Agency 
Worker Directive, allowing UK business to continue to access agency workers at differential 
cost.  
 
Additional legislation that has facilitated the undermining of labour is outlined below. As it 
has also been argued, such developments in the employment relationship have been done 
alongside financial deregulation, though there is insufficient space to discuss that in any more 
detail hereii. The next section explores how state regulation has facilitated the financialization 
of the employment relationship, with specific reference to policies that assist the declining 
share of labour income and facilitate wage stagnation and low wages. The application and 
proliferation of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) and zero-hour contracts (ZHCs), is 
examined as these have further enabled the emergence of disconnected capitalism, allowing 
for greater value extraction by organizations, prioritization of shareholder value and the 
µSUHFDUL]DWLRQRIZRUNHUV¶$SSD\.  
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The financialization of the employment relationship: Active Labour Market Policies, 
Zero Hour Contracts, and the reconfiguration of paid employment  
 
Examining the role of legislation and regulation allows us to understand how precariousness 
is an active process by which precarity is implemented and institutionalized (Appay, 2010: 
37-38). The result is an ideological shift in the way in which individuals, the State, work, and 
society are understood, as well as how individuals are increasingly exposed to the destructive 
processes of the global economy, whilst simultaneously being held increasingly more 
responsible for their own circumstances and future (Appay, 2010; Bryan et al, 2009). This 
section examines how the combined use of ALMPs and the rise in the use of ZHCs is not just 
reconfiguring the nature of paid work, but also enabling the increase in low paid work (both 
directly and indirectly) in the UK economy.  
 
In recent decades, ALMPs have been used in welfare reform in order to change the 
institutional regulation of the labour market by seeking to re-commodify labour, by 
increasing participation and reducing spending on jobless benefits (Greer, 2015). Specific 
attention has been given to the emergence of workfarist social policy and also the increased 
use of ZHCs, both of which, it is argued (e.g. Greer, 2015; Moore, 2014), have delivered an 
industrial reserve army mechanism, increased precarity, and driven down wages, both 
directly and indirectly. 
 
The idea of activation as an employment policy concept emerged in response to criticisms of 
welfare states during the 1970s (Pierson, 2001), particularly to the belief that ³welfare 
benefits reduce workers¶ incentives to take jobs LQDGGLWLRQWRLQFXUULQJµFRVWVWKDWUHGXFHG
capitalists¶ incentives to invest and to reinforce long-term unemployment and associated 
inequalities of income, wealth, health and happiness´ (Greer, 2015: 2). Engaging in 
activation was seen as preferable to simply abolishing welfare payments, as outright attempts 
to eliminate welfare apparatus often fail, as communities of support develop around them 
(Esping-Anderson 1998: 80). Instead, the notion of unemployment provision is maintained, 
which allows the state to roll-back the cost and scope of public provision while 
simultaneously extending the market in the space vacated; such as we have seen with 
workfarism. Gray (2010) KDVDUJXHGWKDW³[a]n increase in state power has always been the 
inner logic of neoliberalism, because, in order to inject markets into every corner of social 
life, a government nHHGVWREHKLJKO\LQYDVLYH´S). As such, the intention of ALMPs is not 
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to eradicate welfare, but to enact institutional change that consequently intensifies control 
over job seekers and makes them more compliant in low-wage jobs (Greer, 2015: 3).  
 
It is widely acknowledged that UK activation regime began with the first Restart interviews 
in 1986, which were compulsory interviews for unemployed claimants (Martin, 2015; Van 
Reenen, 2001). In addition, in 1986 the government extended the unemployment insurance 
disqualification period for those deemed to have left their jobs voluntarily from 6 to 13 weeks 
(Van Reenen, 2001). Restart also offered a £20 bonus to job seekers if they took a low paid 
job (Van Reenen, 2001: 7), and set a trend that would see the conditionality of benefits 
progressively tightened through the early 1990s, until eventually unemployment benefit was 
replaced by the JobseHNHUV¶$OORZDQFH-6$LQ(Martin, 2015). A range of measures 
were introduced with the intention of improving job search (for example, an agreement that 
the unemployed could not refuse jobs outside their own occupation after 3 months 
unemployment) and there were also increased checks were introduced over eligibility of 
claimants (Van Reenen, 200: 8). After the 1997 general election, the New Labour 
government introduced (from 1998 onwards) a series of so-FDOOHGµNew Deals¶ targeted at 
specific groups: the groups included youth, long-term JSA claimants aged 25±49, lone 
parents, and those with registered disabilities (Martin, 2015). As with earlier activation 
regimes, welfare and work were increasingly intertwined, alongside sanctions for refusal to 
engage with work when offered (Martin, 2015; Van Reenen, 2001). 
 
More recently, the proliferation of ALMP has tended to adopt the face of workfare. Workfare 
is a term used to describe any regulation of the labour market through an emphasis on job 
search, conditionality, and sanction (Vis, 2007). Workfare is not simply a development in the 
UK, but can be seen within many industrialised economies (a study by Vis in 2007 compares 
16 countries that have implemented workfare activation between 1985-2002), and sits within 
a global trend in capitalist countries since the onset and dominance of neoliberal thinking 
during the 1980s (Vis, 2007). Workfare involves policies whereby individuals are required to 
undertake work requested of them, in return for benefit payment (Greer, 2015) rather than a 
salary from the corporation. Failure to undertake the requested work, results in the risk of 
losing whatever prescribed benefit/welfare payment.  
 
Workfare placement schemes in the UK tend to last for a 13-week period. The TUC (2014a) 
has argued that workfare is inherently exploitative of unemployed people as it compels them 
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to work at a job that pays below the National Minimum Wage (NMW). In addition, it also 
leads to the deterioration of pay and overtime for permanent employees and the loss of paid 
jobs in the labour market as organizations use cheap workfare labourers to do jobs they 
would have once paid employees to do. A key neoliberal argument in favour of workfare is 
that it is assumed to 1) improve the employment prospects of unemployed/Job Seekers 
Allowance (JSA) claimants once the 13-week workfare period is over, and 2) reduce the 
number of people claiming JSA overall. However, the Department of Work and Pensions¶ 
(DWP) own assessment of the success of workfare in achieving these objectives 
demonstrates that neither has been met. In direct contradiction to the assumption that those 
who completed 13-weeks workfare placements did better in finding paid employment than 
WKRVHµGURSSHGRXW¶the DWP (2014) discovered that it was actually those who left the 
scheme that had much higher rates of finding paid employment. This suggests that the 
neoliberal assumption upon which workfare is founded is inaccurate; though as we know, a 
failure of policy does not dissuade policy makers from continuing with the application of 
neoliberal or market-based solutions (Brown, 2010). 
 
According to the DWP (2014) data, of those who made it to the end of their 13-week period, 
just 26% ended up in paid employment. This compares quite unfavourably to 60% of those 
who dropped out midway through the scheme and around half of those who refused to take 
part at all. In addition, the decrease in JSA claimants was considered µQHJOLJLEOH¶DWPLQXV
0.8%. Ultimately, based on the UK government¶s own data, the implementation and 
continued enforcement of workfare is not effective in achieving the stated goals of the policy. 
However, as previously argued, this does not necessarily mean the policy will be abandoned; 
indeed, this has far not been the case, and the policy has simply been rebranded. So why keep 
the policy?  
 
As Dumenil and Levy (2011) remind us, financialization has a clear class dimension, and 
whilst the gains for government from driving down the JSA bill may be small, the benefit for 
big business is significant as they receive state-subsidized cheap labour. However, they 
primarily benefit from a regulatory regime that allows them to strategically extract greater 
value from their employees. In aQHUDRIµILQDQFLDOL]HGFDSLWDOLVP¶, the ruling class no longer 
draws its power mainly from control over the means of production as this does not offer a 
reliable lucrative return on capital (Foster and Holleman, 2010; Froud et al., 2006). Instead, 
the ruling class now draws wealth and power from control over the means of finance (Foster 
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and Holleman, 2010). However, this is not a pHUPDQHQWVWDWHRIDIIDLUVDQG³neither the 
continued ascendancy of finance capital, nor its future demise can be regarded certain at this 
SRLQW´ (Foster and Holleman, 2010; 192).  
 
What is clear, however, is that capital has demonstrated itself to be dependent on the 
financialization of the employment relationship in order to continue to extract value for 
shareholders (Froud et al, 2006). This requires the gradual transformation of the State and the 
welfare it provides, rather than its abolishment (Esping-Anderson, 1998). The 
implementation of activation, however, allows for low waged work to become naturalized, 
viewed as inevitable, but also preferable to engaging with workfare (Greer, 2016). Thus, 
despite the functional incentives of ALMP, these policies are ultimately a direct form of 
negative state intervention.  
 
Another development that helps to explain why British wages remain low is connected to the 
increase in temporary and agency workers and the rapid increase in the use of ZHCs. ZHC 
are ³a type of employment contract under which an employer is not required to offer an 
employee any defined number of working hours and the employee is, in turn, neither 
guaranteed any set number of working hours nor obliged to take any offered´ (Pennycook et 
al., 2013: 6). As such the individual worker only receives pay for the working hours for 
which they are required and these hours may be subject to variation on a daily or weekly 
basis, with no need for consultation or notice. According to research by the Resolution 
Foundation, ZHCs have several implications for employees: the ability to manage household 
income and family commitments is disrupted, and employment rights and job quality are also 
negatively impacted, alongside complications claiming tax credits and other benefits 
(Pennycook et al., 2013: 16-19).  
 
In the UK, government figures recorded an increase of 15 per cent in ZHCs between 2014 
and 2015 ± in December 2015 the ONS estimated that 801,000 UK workers were employed 
on such contracts, compared to 697,000 workers in the same period in 2014 (ONS, 2015). 
This accounts for 1 in every 40 workers in the UK (ONS, 2015). The widespread practice of 
employing workers on ZHCs means that workers are not guaranteed work, and thus a stable 
weekly wage eludes them. The average weekly earnings of ZHC workers in 2015 were £188, 
compared to £479 for permanent workers and two-fifths (39 per cent) of ZHC workers earn 
less than £111 a week (TUC, 2016). The result is that they ultimately become responsible for 
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managing the economic and financial risks linked to their own productive activities, and this 
institutionalises precariousness. This disproportionately affects vulnerable populations, such 
as those on low wages (the working poor) and women (Appay, 2010); 55 per cent of those on 
ZHCs are women (ONS 2014). This is most evident in the care sector, which pays low wages 
and is a predominately female labour force (Moore, 2014). 
 
Moore (2014: 1) argues that ZHCs ³reconfigure the labour process and disrupt the 
construction of working time as paid time´ because working time is bifurcated into 
productive and unproductive periods, working time is only considered valid when it is 
spatially anchored inside the confines of the workplace. This has significant implications for 
pay levels as it renders statutory or voluntary minimum hourly pay rates ineffectual (Moore 
2014). In addition to securing low pay, this leads not only to the intensification and 
extensification of working time (Hayes and Moore 2014), but also facilitates the shifting 
boundaries between commodified and de-commodified time (Tuckman 2005). As such, the 
proliferation of ZHCs are a significant element of the proliferation of unpaid labour in the 
UK economy, and is a significant facilitating factor of the low pay economy.  
 
Given that the model of ZHCs relies on offering zero security of hours for employees, such 
contracts have attracted criticism from a wide constituency base (Brinkley, 2013; Cushen, 
2013; Moore 2014) as they increase asymmetry of power in the labour market whilst 
redefining and reconstituting paid labour. However, these contracts are part of the regulatory 
mechanisms that underpin the new corporate governance normativity already discussed, and 
the increasing financialization of the employment relationship as evidenced by disconnected 
capitalism. ALMPs and ZHCs, therefore, represent more than simply a key mechanism in 
making µwork not pay¶± though it is true they do this. As argued by Thompson (2003), 
financialization has become the key driver of corporate and workplace change. ALMPs and 
ZHCs, therefore, are a connected to the development of financialization, but they are not a 
result of financialization. Rather, they are created and maintained by State regulation, which 
benefits capital at the expense of labour, and legitimizes the financialization of the 
employment relationship by allowing capital to extract value via the processes outlined.  
 
+D\HVDQG0RRUH¶V2014) study of homecare workers is particularly illuminating in 
confirming this. They argue that ZHCs are a key mechanism through which µunproductive¶ 
time is managed out of the labour process with paid and unpaid working time blurred. ZHCs 
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effectively restructure working time by introducing episodic working where workers are not 
paid for time between shifts despite being available to the employer. The result is that many 
once hourly rates are averaged out over time available to the employer so ZHC staff are not in 
reality receiving a NMW (Moore and Tailby, 2015). This allows organizations to unshackle 
themselves from the burden of paying for unproductive time, and the employer captures the 
value that has been taken from the employee, returning greater shareholder value.  
 
Ultimately, ZHCs are associated with lower hourly rates of pay than permanent contracts, 
evidenced by TUC research that reveals that the average hourly wage for a worker on a ZHC 
was £8.83 an hour in 2014, which is approximately a third less than the average for staff on 
permanent contracts (£13.39) (TUC, 2014b). Other evidence supports this; for instance, the 
CIPD (2013) found that half of all ZHC workers earn less than £15,000 per year compared 
with just 6 per cent of all employees. In addition, findings from WERS 2011 (van Wanrooy et 
al., 2013) indicate that workplaces using ZHCs have a higher proportion of staff paid 
between NMW rates and £7.50 an hour, than those companies that do not use these types of 
contracts. What we see, therefore, is that ALMPs and ZHCs epitomize the financialization of 
the employment relationship, as they create regulatory space legitimized by the State for 
organizations to extract value from their workforce.  
 
The result is a transformation of labour markets, which has been undertaken alongside 
regulation that has systematically weakened the institutions of labour, such as the 
introduction of anti-trade union legislation since the 1980s by Thatcher governments, and 
continued by successive governments (Fuchs, 2016; Williams, Scott and Welch, 2016;). This 
legislation has not only weakened the position and power of workers but more specifically 
has constrained XQLRQV¶ability to defend workers in certain circumstances, but has also de-
legitimated collective action, and undermined institutions of collective labour market 
regulation (Kelly and Heery, 1994; Daniels and McIlroy, 2009).  
 
In the UK, the removal of trade union rights is a key explanatory factor of workforce 
exploitation, which is evident in the deterioration of working conditions and benefits, erosion 
of job security and employment protection (Daniels and McIlroy, 2009). However, the Trade 
Union Act 2016 further tightens restrictions on union activity, despite the fact that the UK is 
currently experiencing an unprecedented and sustained period of low levels of industrial 
action (Lyddon, 2015: 733; Darlington and Dobson, 2015). The Trade Union Act 2016 is 
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described by Ford and Novitz (2016) DVD³ragbag of different measures, united only by a 
common theme of placing more controls on trade unions ² restricting union-supported 
industrial action and picketing, LQFUHDVLQJWKH&HUWLILFDWLRQ2IILFHU¶V powers of intervention 
and eQIRUFHPHQWUHVWULFWLQJXQLRQV¶IDFLOLW\WLPHDQGXVHRIFKHFN-off in the public sector 
DQGSODFLQJDGGLWLRQDOFRQVWUDLQWVRQXQLRQV¶SROLWLFDOIXQGV´S277). They go on to argue 
that the combined effect of the measures included in the Act represent the most significant 
WUDGHXQLRQOHJLVODWLRQVLQFHWKH(PSOR\PHQW$FWDQGGHPRQVWUDWHD³VXGGHQ
acceleration in the incremental legislative controls subsequently introduced by Conservative 
JRYHUQPHQWV´)RUGDQG1RYLW] The Trade Union Act 2016 reveals the way in 
which neoliberal ideology has embedded itself into the State apparatus and its enactment 
exposes how the State sees and engages with its regulatory role. Based on the Act, we can see 
that the State ± whilst deregulating labour market protection for workers (via ALMPs and 
ZHC) ± is adopting an opposing regulatory stance with regards to ZRUNHUV¶ ability to protect 
their own interests, by adding considerably more restrictions and constraints.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This paper has examined a set of interconnected macro and micro factors that suggest that 
low pay is set to remain entrenched in the UK. It has shown that this is not the result of some 
natural response to labour market demands. Far from it, these policy choices are neoliberal in 
motivation, with the outcome of establishing low pay and insecure employment being 
deliberate. Corporations benefit from neoliberal regulation and can extract greater surplus 
value as a result of them; indeed, this is a main characteristic of value extraction and profit 
return to shareholders in contemporary organizations. As has become evident, this situation is 
the result of choices made by the State. These choices include pursuing a policy of activation, 
which (amongst other things) compels workers to take low paid employment, alongside 
lowering employment protections, by permitting the extensive use of ZHCs. Both, taken 
together represent a financialization of the employment relationship, which is favorable to 
corporations, and undermines labour.  
 
There are clear contradictions in the neoliberal message that unregulated markets (or markets 
regulated following the neoliberal economic model) will lead to the greater social good 
(Merino et al, 2010: 775). One such contradiction is that in pursuit of unregulated markets, 
the process of neoliberalization has entailed regulation and µFUHDWLYHGHVWUXFWLRQ¶of prior 
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institutional frameworks and powers, which seek to challenge traditional forms of state 
sovereignty (Harvey, 2005). What we see is not the ushering in of an objective unregulated 
market model ± which is perceived as morally preferable to State intervention ± but simply a 
different type of regulation that seeks to bring all forms of human action into the domain of 
the market (Harvey, 2005). The assertion that unregulated markets will deliver greater social 
good is also questionable, as evidence shows that economic performance under a more 
regulated model of capitalism in the years after the Second World War was better on all 
economic goals ± with the exception of inflation ± when compared with more unregulated 
market capitalism of recent decades (Lansley, 2011). 
 
However, regardless of the failure of neoliberal policies to achieve their stated objectives ± be 
this the particular regulatory mechanisms examined in this paper or the corporate crises we 
witness around us ± neoliberal rhetoric remains strong in underpinning state regulation 
(Grady, 2010, 2013, 2015, 2016). This has led some to conclude that neoliEHUDOLVP³KDV
VXFFHHGHGDVWKHFODVVSURMHFWRIFDSLWDO´7DEE:HVHHLQWKLVSDSHUWKHH[WHQWWR
which contemporary organizations disproportionately benefit from this development to the 
detriment of workers. The regulation outlined in this paper (ALMPs and ZHCs) ± which 
seeks to undermine the position of labour within the labour market ± has ironically produced 
a situation where further regulation is required to support workers, and protect them from 
these new vulnerabilities.  
 
Indeed, stronger trade unions, and legislation to support workers is needed now more than 
ever if workers are to be protected from the new corporate normativity which seeks to further 
extract profit from the labour process, and challenge government regulation that 
institutionalises the asymmetry of power which allows such practices. Though it is difficult to 
imagine such legislation being implemented in an era of financialized capitalism. However, 
without regulation that supports and protects workers, challenging low pay will continue to 
be a rhetorical endeavour, where workers continue to lose and will likely be compelled to 
take indirect pay cuts via ZHCs.  
  
Neoliberalism not only fosters a particular type of corporate governance normativity, but it 
also produces regulatory frameworks that allow and encourage the financialization of the 
HPSOR\PHQWUHODWLRQVKLS$VSURILWEHFRPHVWKHIRFDOSRLQWIRURUJDQLVDWLRQV³HYHU\WKLQJ
else, from product quality to the workforce, becomes cost to be controlled and reduced. 
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Profits over people, profits over environment, profits over community, (fake) profits, even, 
RYHUVKDUHKROGHUV´9LGDOAs a result of the regulation outlined in this paper, 
individuals are increasingly exposed to the destructive processes of the market, and 
compelled to take responsibility for their own economic futures, despite protections from the 
worse excesses of the market being removed (Appay, 2010; Bryan et al, 2009).  
 
As discussed in this paper, the State remains a powerful and transformative actor, regulating 
to ensure greater labour market flexibility and free-market dominance. Through government 
regulation, it is making citizens the shock absorber for global capitalism, and undermining 
the position of workers in the labour market; allowing organizations to exploit them as a key 
source of value extraction. Further research examining the various ways in which State 
regulation facilitates the financialization of the employment relationship is needed, in 
addition to research that examines the ways in which financialization is experienced by and 
impacts on ZRUNHUV¶ day-to-day lives.  
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